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Welfare State Retrenchment
in Central and Eastern Europe:
the Case of Pension Reforms in
Poland and Slovenia
Igor Guardiancich
This paper endeavours to shed some light on the mechanisms that led
tothedivergenceofwelfarestatearrangementsacrossCentralandEast-
ern Europe (). In particular, pension system reforms displayed a
great deal of variance, which surprised both institutionalists and con-
vergence theorists. The Polish and Slovenian cases are thus presented
andcomparedinapolitical economyperspective.Theoriesofretrench-
ment, recent studies on the dynamics of pension reforms and con-
sultations with some of the relevant actors, were employed in order to
account for the divergence of reform outcomes in the two countries.
The study focused on three main explanations: partisan competition,
the interaction between relevant external (World Bank) and internal
actors (Minister of Labour and Minister of Finance) and the trade-oﬀ
between power concentration and accountability concentration. The
latter yielded the best explanation. While Polish reformers managed
to internalise most veto actors’ reservations, Slovenian politicians ex-
cluded from consultation the country’s main trade union. Its opposi-
tion determined the rejection of radical reforms recommended by the
World Bank.
Introduction
After the collapse of Communism in , most countries embraced
the neo-liberal strategy of stabilisation, liberalisation and privatisation.
Although the inherited socialist premature welfare state was intellectu-
ally bankrupt, mismatched with the objectives and principles of a mar-
ket economy and illegitimate in the eyes of the public (Rueschemeyer
, ), its reform was not seen as a priority, and it was postponed until
the second wave of reforms. Local politicians were afraid of social un-
rest, were still convinced that the socialist system could cope with the ﬁs-
cal pressures, and they used social security to mitigate the worst strains
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engendered by the transition. Price liberalisation (ending the implicit
subsidies), privatisation of ﬁrms (establishing hard budget constraints
and shifting the responsibility for welfare provision from the ﬁrm to the
state), rising unemployment, increasing absolute poverty and the output
decline, which entailed a collapse in state revenues, made social security
reforms unavoidable from both the social and ﬁscal standpoints (Wa-
gener , –).
Most institutionalists expected from  countries the creation of a
corporatist-conservative (Esping-Andersen , –) welfare arrange-
ment, becausethesocialistandpre-war systems wereemployment-based
and because continental Western Europe was seen as s powerful in-
ﬂuencing factor. However, they overlooked the persisting instability of
 institutions and the fact that both the European Agreements and
the acquis communautaire say precious little in the welfare state realm,
since the details of social policy are delegated to single Member States
(Wagener , –). In contrast, neoclassical convergence theorists
predicted that  countries would heed the World Bank’s ()r e c -
ommendations and end up with a liberal welfare state, forgetting that
path-dependence plays a crucial role where policy feedback and high
ﬁxed costs, determined by large, inherited Pay-As-You-Go Deﬁned Ben-
eﬁt (-) schemes, prevent radical policy shifts (Myles and Pierson
, ). The comparison of pension reforms in Poland and Slovenia
proves that both camps were wrong.¹ If fundamental reform of the pen-
sion system means its (partial) privatisation, which is what the  rec-
ommends,thenPolandintroducedradicalchanges,whileSloveniaended
up with patching-up measures (Chło´ ne ta l ., ;M ü l l e r, ).
While this essay will employ the literature on retrenchment in post-
communist , it will not directly address its dynamics.² Instead it will
tryt oe x p l a i n ,t h r o u ghac o m p a ri s o no ft h epo l i ti c a le c o n o m yo fr e f o rm s
in Poland and Slovenia, the factors accounting for the divergence of their
pension systems and to discuss the problems associated with passing a
politically and economically unattractive reform, such as a radical de-
parture from the Bismarckian-Beveridgean paradigm (Müller , )
in old age security. This study will be structured as follows. In the ﬁrst
part, Pension reforms in premature welfare states, the problems associated
with the privatisation of  pension systems will be addressed. In the
second, Pension reforms in Poland and Slovenia, a brief political economy
accountontheevolutionofthesocialistpensionsystemuptothepresent
schemeswillbepresented.Thelastsection,Hypothesesondivergence,will
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analyse the institutional and political factors accounting for the lack of
convergence between the two countries’ reform paths.
Pension Reform in PrematureWelfareStates
 
The socialist welfare state roughly matched the continental European
Bismarckian system. In fact, beneﬁts were a worker’s privilege and not a
social citizenship right. The diﬀerence was not straightforward since so-
cialism maximised labour participation, and unemployment was practi-
cally absent (Wagener , ). Most socialist countries had a uniﬁed
pensionscheme,whichwasincludedintothestatebudget,therebycross-
subsidising other expenditure items. Employees’ contributions were
largely abolished, leaving employers’ contributions as the only source
of ﬁnancing. The coverage was expanded to the majority of the popula-
tion. Therefore the system guaranteed horizontal equity, but could not
prevent vertical eﬃciency problems, i.e. leakages in targeting, and ris-
ing expenditures (Barr , –). The low pensionable age was seen
as a victory for socialism. The scheme was managed by trade unions.
The contribution-beneﬁt link was weak, as beneﬁts were usually based
on best-earnings formulae (cfr. Myles and Pierson , ). Beneﬁts
were low and hardly diﬀerentiated, but universalism was breached by
the privileges granted to employees who held risky or unhealthy jobs,
classiﬁed as important for the advancement of socialism. Unsystematic
indexation produced trans-generational inequity, since older pensions
were continuously losing purchasing power (cfr. Müller , –).
During the early transition these problems degenerated. The access to
beneﬁts became even easier after the relaxation of early retirement and
disability criteria, intended to alleviate the pressure on the overstrained
labour markets by pushing the unemployed out of the labour force alto-
gether, and to buy social peace by granting privileges to the most endan-
gered groups (miners, heavy industry workers etc.; Gomulka , –).
The falling revenues associated with the output decline, tax evasion and
theinformalisation oftheeconomy rendered thepension systems ﬁscally
unaﬀordable and in need of deep reforms. In Table  the main indicators
of the Polish and Slovenian pension systems are presented.
Barr (, –)u s e s data to calculate the ratio between sys-
tem dependency and age dependency. The results ( for Poland, 
for Slovenia) show that the leakages (people below the retirement age re-
ceiving a pension, compared to those above the age) are respectively %
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Table : Pension system selected indicators
Poland Slovenia
System dependency ratio () .% .%
Age dependency ratio* .%–.% .%–.%
Replacement rate (–) % .%
Social contributions
(old-age and non old-age)
.% .%–
.%
.% .%
   
Public pension spending
￿ .% .% .% .%
State budget transfers
￿ .% .%– .% .%
Implicit debt
￿ –% –%
No reform scenario  
Public pension spending
￿ .–.% .%
Contribution rate needed in  – n.a.
* Poland: old-age population/working population in – (Security , );
Slovenia: +/– in – (Stanovnik , ).
￿ As percentage of .
Sources: Gomulka ;H a u s n e r;L i n d e m a ne ta l .;O r e n s t e i n; Security
;S t a n o v n i k.
and %, among highest in the world. This similarity, and the fact that
after the failed early attempts at stabilisation both countries increased
payroll taxes to cover the soaring expenditures, makes the two systems
wellsuitedforacomparisonfocusedoninstitutionalandpolitical,rather
than on structural or economic factors.³
  ’
The  became a major external actor in post-communist social pol-
icy reorganisation (Orenstein , ) after it included speciﬁc pension
reforms into the neoliberal ‘Washington Consensus’ package, following
thepositivedevelopments inChileandArgentina(Müller,). ’s
 publication ‘Averting the Old Age Crisis’ supported the introduc-
tion of private elements into existing  schemes. According to the
Bank, these not only render the schemes ﬁscally sustainable when con-
frontedwithmountingdemographicproblems,butalsopromotegrowth
through the expansion of capital markets, savings and investments. In
this framework the state retains a residual role of poverty alleviation and
pension fund supervision, mainly because state-run  systems had
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Table :T h et h r e epillars⁴
Redistributive plus
coinsurance
Savings plus
coinsurance
Savings plus
coinsurance
Objectives
Means-tested,
minimum pension
guarantee, or ﬂat
Personal savings plan
or occupational plan
Personal savings plan
or occupational plan
Form
Tax-ﬁnanced Regulated fully funded Fully funded Financing
Mandatory publicly
managed (st) pillar
Mandatory privately
managed (nd) pillar
Voluntary (rd) pillar
Source: World Bank , 
ﬁnancially spun out of control in middle- and high-income countries,
becoming neither eﬃcient, nor equitable, nor sustainable ( , ,
–). ‘Averting the OldAge Crisis’ became a catalyst for intellectual con-
frontation, which generated a global social policy debate between var-
ious international organisations (cfr. Deacon , –), and it even
triggered a wide diversiﬁcation of views within the (Stanovnik ,
). ’sapproachwastermed byLoVuolothe‘newpensionorthodoxy’
(Müller , ) and it is schematically summarised in Table .
This paper’s main assumption is that the introduction of a privately
managedmandatoryfullyfundedsecondpillarmightbepoliticallyfeasi-
ble,butitiseconomicallyhardlydesirablein .Infacttheinstitutional
prerequisites of private pension fundsaremoredemanding than thoseof
publicsystems, becausethey callfor developed ﬁnancial markets,regula-
torycapacityandpoliticalstabilitytofunctioneﬀectively.Theseareoften
missing in . In addition, the only available ﬁnancial assets might be
high risk and low yield (Barr , ). Finally, and more convincingly,
the transition costs are gigantic, due to the implicit debts inherited from
the socialist era.⁵ The set up of even a modest  inspired second pillar
renders part of the implicit debt explicit, which causes the double pay-
mentproblem.MylesandPierson(,–)makeacleardistinction
between mature  systems and latecomers, claiming that the former
cannot heed the ’s recommendation and should instead opt for a ra-
tionalisation (i.e. parametric reform) of the existing  arrangement.
schemescanbeassimilatedwiththese.Fixinga isprobablyless
costly than resorting to funding.
Followingthiswaveofdisapproval,the concededthatanuncritical
acceptance of its recommendations should be avoided. In fact Von Gers-
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dorﬀ,a oﬃcial, recently admitted that too heavy a load had been
placed on  pension systems, in terms of using them to simultane-
ously promote savings, capital markets, economic growth and address
social problems (Report ).
Pension reformsinPolandandSlovenia
 
In contrast to the political economy of retrenchment, authors who ex-
plicitly deal with pension reforms in  are relatively few. The account
of the political economy of pension reforms in Poland and Slovenia will
be based upon the research by Müller () and Orenstein ()f o r
Poland and by Stanovnik ()f o rS l o v e n i a .
Orenstein’s framework will be used. It is based on Weir and Skocpol’s
(cfr. Orenstein , –) seminal work, which laid the foundations for
the new institutionalism, stressing the importance of both the state as
an autonomous actor and policy feedback leading to path-dependence.
Orenstein adds the international organisations (especially the  and
), which inﬂuence decision making through:
• contributions to the global social policy discourse, conferences and
publications which constrain national policy, and
• direct intervention, which includes all forms of technical assistance
(sending of missions, ﬁnancial assistance, the secondment of 
employees; Orenstein , –).
 conditionalities are used as blame avoidance mechanisms for un-
popular policy measures by radical reformers, whose commitment to
reforms is a signalling mechanism, which is highly appreciated by ﬁ-
nancial markets (Müller , ). Speciﬁcally for pension reforms, the
exerted its inﬂuence through the agenda setting role in local debates
(Müller , ) and by spreading intellectual innovations within the
global social policy discourse.
Despitethisfocusoninstitutionsandinternationalactors,bothMüller
and Orenstein (Stanovnik follows his logic) emphasise the interaction
between domestic actors, thereby taking on a more pluralistic approach.
Since negotiated reform of the welfare state is the norm, as compared
to governmental unilateralism (cfr. Rhodes , –), these interac-
tions are present in both actor-centred (Müller , –) and rational
choiceinstitutionalism.Intheformertheconstellationofavailableactors
is given by the institutional setting. The actors display determined pref-
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erences and their interaction decides the ﬁnal policy outcomes (Müller
, –). The latter interprets the institutional setting as a constraint
for the available policy options (especially the size of the implicit debt,
i.e. the maturity of a pension system), but it also focuses on the power
concentration of the executive (veto actors and veto points, cfr. Tsebelis
), which enhances its ability to pass unpopular legislation.
The description of the four phases of pension reforms in Poland and
Slovenia will follow Orenstein’s (, –) timeline. From socialism to
transition economics describes the inherited system and the initial re-
forms. Commitment-building starts when political actors become aware
that reform is necessary (usually following the advice of external actors,
cfr. Cashu , ) and ends with the government’s adoption of a single
reform programme. During coalition-building ﬁnal legislation is passed
and reformers try to prevent anti-reform mobilisation. Implementation
instead poses new problems and introduces new actors (private pension
funds). The outcomes can be eventually evaluated. Since relevant actors
were not excluded from earlier reform phases in Poland and Slovenia,
probably only further ﬁne-tuning measures are to be expected (Oren-
stein , –; Stanovnik , –).

From Socialism to Transition Economics
During the interwar period two uniﬁed Bismarckian pension schemes
covered white- and blue-collar workers. In  a - system with
Soviet features replaced the fully funded schemes. It continued to be
managed by the Social Insurance Institute ()( M ü l l e r, –).
Pensions were ﬁnanced by employers’ contributions and beneﬁts were
relatively high, but the ‘old pension portfolio’ problem, stemming from
unsystematic indexation, implied that older pensions were losing pur-
chasing power. Therefore % of those who reached their pensionable
age continued to be employed (Müller , –).
After  high unemployment and relaxation of retirement and dis-
ability requirements brought the system into open crisis.⁷ Stabilisation
was attempted through ad hoc measures (Orenstein , )w h i c h ,d e -
spitetheirexcessivesupportofbeneﬁtadequacy,wereﬁercelyopposedby
the ‘grey lobby’ (Müller , ). The latter was eventually responsible
for post-Solidarity’s electoral defeat against the Democratic Left Alliance
() and Polish Peasant Party coalition in  (Chło´ ne ta l ., ).
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Commitment-Building
Even before the -coalition stepped into oﬃce the debate around
pension reforms was heated. There were three camps: ‘rationalisers’, re-
formers and non-reformers (Chło´ ne ta l ., ). The non-reformers
enacted the early ad hoc measures, which were stopped by the Constitu-
tional Tribunal in .T h er e f o r m e r sp r o p o s e dd i ﬀerent radical plans.
The Ministry of Finance (o) under Kołodko published ‘Strategy for
Poland’ in June  and suggested the introduction of a mandatory sec-
ond pillar. Solidarity advocated a similar arrangement. The Minister of
Labour and Social Aﬀairs (o) Miller was a ‘rationaliser’. He supported
voluntarysavingsandaparametric reformof theﬁrstpillar,but thepub-
lic found his plan too timid (Hausner , ). The stalemate which
ensued between Kołodko and Miller was broken only by the appoint-
ment of a new o,B˛ aczkowski, who was an independent and a former
Solidarity activist. From  he was chairman of the Tripartite Com-
mission for Socio-Economic Aﬀairs. He managed to create a link with
the opposing Solidarity Electoral Action () and established the Of-
ﬁce of the Plenipotentiary for Social Security Reform ()i nA p ri l
(Orenstein , –). The  reinforced its position by ﬁnancing the
creationofthe andbylettingthePolish oﬃcialRutkowskiadvise
it (Müller , ).
Coalition-Building
o B˛ aczkowski died in November , putting the whole reform at
risk. Hausner became the plenipotentiary and he won independence
from the new o Zieli´ nski, who opposed radical reforms. (Orenstein
, ). ‘Security through Diversity’ was approved in April  and
advocated a multi-pillar system, including a Notional Deﬁned Contri-
bution ()  ﬁrst, a mandatory funded private second⁸ and a pri-
vate voluntary funded third pillar. The Tripartite Commission approved
the proposal in April  without opposition from the social partners,
and the government supported the proposal with a massive information
campaign (Chło´ n , ). The Sejm approved the easy laws (espe-
cially the regulationof the second andthirdpillars)swiftlyand withhigh
cross-parliamentary support (Orenstein , )i nS e p t e m b e r,b e -
cause these introduced new elements into the system, leaving unchanged
the existing ones (Chło´ ne ta l ., ).
The - coalition won the  general elections. The second
phase of coalition-building started. Although rare in Polish politics,
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a cross-coalition consensus was reached (Müller , ). The newly
appointed plenipotentiary Lewicka, a senior Solidarity pension expert,
wholeheartedly embraced the reforms (Chło´ ne ta l ., ). The Free-
dom Union () did not oppose ‘Security through Diversity’ as it was
involved in its preparation, but  was sceptical. After the govern-
ment’s formal approval of reforms in April ,  and  entered a
stalemate (resolved with the support of )i nt h ea l l - p a r l i a m e n tE x -
traordinary Commission. Solidarity and raised a numberof issues,
but they preferred to reach an agreement, rather than mobilise against
reforms (Orenstein , ). The whole debate took much longer, be-
cause the laws (the reform of the ﬁrst pillar and the reorganisation of
) remodelled the existing schemes (Chło´ ne ta l ., ). In Decem-
ber  both laws were adopted.
Implementation
The hasty approval was achieved at the expense of many details, whose
determination was postponed (the law on annuities) (Chło´ n , ).
The  (the farmers’ fund) and disability pensions were left un-
touched. The Polish reform achieved a double individualisation through
the mandatory second pillar and the ﬁrst - scheme, thereby
grantingmoretransparency,ﬁscalstabilityandlessredistribution.Lower
indexation will eventually lead to a surplus after . These savings,
alongwithexplicitdebtandprivatisationrevenueswillbeusedtoﬁnance
the transition. According to Chło´ n( , –), ’s forecasts are
overoptimistic (cfr.Security ,–,).Fallingreplacement rates will
give rise to beneﬁt adequacy and poverty alleviation concerns (Geroldi
and Merano , ). Implementation was extremely problematic: the
participation rate in the mandatory scheme exceeded all expectations
(Chło´ n , –; Fultz , –), the  was technically unpre-
pared and fraud coupled with high administration costs, determined
negative rates of return for all the funds. Not surprisingly, the public be-
came increasingly disillusioned with the enacted reforms (Chło´ n ,
–).

From Socialism to Transition Economics
The Bismarckian welfare state inherited fromthe Austro-Hungarian em-
pire (Müller , ) was perpetuated during the Yugoslav kingdom
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(Stanovnik , –). After  the pension funds were nation-
alised and a Soviet  system was introduced. The Yugoslav-Soviet
rift put the system in ﬂux (Müller , ), and not until Kardelj’s
 Constitution did federalisation and contribution ﬁnancing become
deﬁnitive. Thereafter guidelines were set at federal level, while at lower
levels ‘self-managed communities of interest’ had extensive regulatory
rights (Stanovnik , ). The pension system preserved some in-
tegrity, since the organisation of the Institute for Pension and Disability
Insurance () was never broken down to sub-republic levels (Böhm
). The  Slovene Pension and Disability Insurance Act ()
included farmers and the self-employed into the scheme. Pensioning cri-
teria were generous and early retirement was only temporarily penalised
(Stanovnik , –). Due to insuﬃcient indexation, beneﬁts were an-
chored to wage growth in , instantly worsening the looming crisis.
The Yugoslav recession hit Slovenia, but the pension system resisted
and the population was suﬃciently satisﬁed with it (Böhm ). Af-
ter independence the system became unsustainable due to the relaxation
of eligibility criteria, unfavourable demographic prospects (Geroldi and
Marano , ) and structural unemployment. The   was a
timidattempt totighten eligibility criteria and asimpleadaptation of the
 . Stabilisation failed and the  became dependent on state
budget transfers (Stanovnik , –). Reforms became unavoidable.
Commitment-Building
The and wereactiveinSloveniaandsuggestedatwo-stagemulti-
pillar reformplan.The -reportinﬂuenced allsubsequent re-
form drafts (Stanovnik , –). The new Minister of Labour, Family
and Social Aﬀairs (o) Rop was appointed after  (United League
of Social Democrats) exited the -led (Liberal Democrats) govern-
ment coalition. Rop invested his entire political career in the pension
reform (Böhm ), and (almost) unilaterally published the ‘Starting
Points for the Reform of the Pension and Disability System of Slove-
nia’, which advocated the introduction of a  inspired second pillar. A
 team criticised the ‘Starting Points’, asserting that the transition
costs would be unbearable. In  the general elections produced a new
coalition between , Desus (Pensioners’ Party) and  (Slovenian
People’s Party). Desus and  were included into the team preparing
the ‘White Paper on the Reform of the Pension and Disability Insurance
inSlovenia’()andsubsequentlyneutralised.The waspublishedin
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November . It envisaged many parametric reforms to the ﬁrst pillar,
the introduction of a mandatory funded privately managed second pil-
lar and the expansion of the (nonexistent) voluntary private third pillar
(cfr. Stanovnik , –). The  was the only oﬃcial reform pro-
posal, because all potential opponents were deliberately excluded, espe-
cially the Association of Free Trade Unions of Slovenia ().
Coalition-Building
DuetotheconcertationcharacterofSloveniandecision-making(Geroldi
and Marano , ) this phase started with the appointment of the tri-
partite negotiating working group for pension reform, which included
the o, the trade unions (and thus the previously excluded ) and
the business associations. The opposed the and was backed up
by the opposition party . It protracted negotiations from January
 until April  (Stanovnik , , ) and started a counter-
information campaign in favour of rationalisation (Böhm ). In
March  it organised the largest protest march ever in independent
Slovenia, claiming that the second pillar would undermine the inter-
generational solidarity and create poverty among pensioners. During
commitment-building o Gaspari delegated the design of reforms to
Rop, butnow heopposedthemandatory funded pillar onﬁscal grounds.
The combined action of the , a critical evaluation of the  by the
economist Bole in a paper commissioned by the  and the negative
opinion of inﬂuential economists determined the quiet demise of the
second pillar in April  and the ﬁnal ’s forfeit. The government
acknowledged ’s veto role, and gave Rop a full mandate in order to
overcome the persisting stalemate (Stanovnik , ). The  
contained deep amendments to the ﬁrst pillar and very generous tax
treatments for the voluntary funded privately-managed third pillar. The
new was approved in Parliament in June .
Implementation
The  praised the Slovenian parametric reform for cutting %o ff u -
ture beneﬁts, without introducing a second pillar (Fultz and Ruck ,
), thereby enabling the use of public pillar savings for other social se-
curity purposes. The  instead calculated that high replacement rates
and (quasi) wage indexation would still engender ﬁscal unsustainability
(Geroldi and Marano , –), forgetting to include the newly intro-
duced trans-generational solidarity indexation element, which reduces
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the yearly adjustments of the stock of pensions in function of the eli-
gibility and accrual criteria of new pensioners (Kidriˇ c , –). This
index yielded encouraging results: both the replacement rate and over-
all pension spending fell. In addition, the recent agreement on public
employee collective schemes is transforming the third pillar into a quasi-
mandatory private pillar of considerable proportions (Stanovnik ),
and there is still some leeway for further parametric reforms.
Hypotheseson Divergence
Summing up, both Slovenia and Poland achieved signiﬁcant retrench-
ment in their pension schemes through parametric reforms, but they
chose a fundamentally diﬀerent stance towards redistribution and risk.
The structural factors which could account for this divergence are the
inherited socialist pension system, the economic crisis in early transition
and the demographic prospects.
The latter two hinge on the ‘beneﬁt of crisis’ argument, which holds
that radical reforms are feasible under critical conditions, when the op-
posing interest groups can easily bebroken (Müller ,). In contrast
Pierson (, ) contends that while retrenchment might be feasible,
radical reforms would still meet with considerable resistance. Other au-
thors (Orenstein , ; Brooks and James , –) suggest that
faced with high implicit debts reformers tend to be more moderate and
retain larger public  pillars.
Neither ﬁscal nor demographic crises can alone explain the ﬁnal out-
comes. In fact the large implicit debts, the early measures cushioning
the labour market and the use of higher contributions to match the ex-
penditures were common to both countries. The lags in tax collection
(the Olivera-Tanzi eﬀect) alsoplayed asigniﬁcant role (Kidriˇ c ). The
demographic prospects were worse in Slovenia (cfr. Stanovnik , ;
GeroldiandMarano,–;Chło´ n,–),butitsreformswere
milder.
With regard to the inherited systems, it is renowned that Bismarck-
ian schemes are resistant to changes, due to the powerful networks of
social support generated by welfare state expansion (Müller , –;
Pierson , –). In fact early reforms were a clear reﬂection of the
existing systems in both countries. The subsequent developments can
be (partially) attributed to the fact that Poland had just earnings-related
beneﬁts, while in Slovenia both contributions and beneﬁts were individ-
ualised already during the s (employers’ contributions reﬂected the
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wages of individual employees). Therefore, the Slovenian system was not
perceived as unfair by the population. Fiscal sustainability became the
major concern. In Poland pensions were seen as opaque and discrimina-
tory, thus both ﬁscal sustainability and individualisation were required.
Therefore the introduction of a new instrument, such as a mandatory
private fundedscheme,wouldhaveproved morediﬃcultinSloveniaand
necessitated a better-designed governmental strategy (Kidriˇ c ).
Since structural factors are not suﬃcient to explain the divergence, the
paper will try to apply three (overlapping) political economy theories of
retrenchment.

According to Kitschelt (, –) the dynamics of party competition
directlyaﬀectretrenchmentpolicies.Ifthemedianvoteropposesunpop-
ular policies, the rational ruling party will not enact them. Thus even
large but weakly organised groups, such as pensioners, gain much elec-
toral power. Nonetheless multiparty politics oﬀer other options, among
which the policy appeal of an alternative government coalition is worth
emphasizing.
Some authors (Müller , ;P i e r s o n, –) include social-
democratic parties among the potential opponents to radical pension
reforms, due to their commitment to existing welfare states. Kitschelt
(,–) instead argues thatitis notthe strengthof labouror social-
democratic parties per se, which impedes retrenchment, but a partisan
alignment of government and opposition parties, where competition is
based on socio-cultural issues and all parties claim to be defenders of the
welfare state. Similarly, Ross (, –) emphasises the electoral strat-
egy of the left as a means of covering the policy ground of the right: the
‘Nixon in China’ argument permits retrenchment, the refusal of neolib-
eralism retains the state in charge, i.e. pension cutbacks without privati-
sation.
Ross’ and Kitschelt’s approaches are maybe only partially suited for
post-communist politics. Various authors (cfr. Innes )s t r e s st h e
instability of  party systems, especially the lack of programmatic
alternatives on the economic front (dictated by external constraints).
Notwithstanding, former national-accommodative communist regimes
(cfr. Kitschelt et al. , –) such as Slovenia and Poland have the best
chances to develop party competition not exclusively focused on valence
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issues. Until then the locus of alternative economic views should maybe
be sought outside the party system.
In Poland the d (Social-democracy of the Republic of Poland),
a communist successor party with a social-liberal, secular inclination,
represented the - coalition’s core and had to compete against
 (national, religious and anti-communist) and  (radical, pro
free-market, secular). Party competition developed over radical reforms
(treated as valence issues, due to the conformity of views) with cultural
values(religion)atthecoreandwasprobablyconducivetoapre-emptive
move by in old age security, because no alternative or credible party
was defending the welfare state’s status quo (cfr. Kitschelt ). Simi-
larly,inSloveniathepartiesidentiﬁed themselvesthroughculturalvalues
and agreed on the direction of economic reforms, transforming them
into valence issues (Ioni¸ t˘ a , , ). The  (civic-liberal) almost
never lost power during the country’s brief history, opting for vari-
ous coalition arrangements. The reformed communists,  (mildly
social-democratic), exited the government in January ,b e c a u s et h e y
opposed outright retrenchment, and remained until  in quasi-
opposition. When  proposed a radical reform no alternative party
could have blocked its policies, which were staunchly opposed only by
the , probably the only credible supporter of social-democracy in
Slovenia.⁹ Thus,whileeliticisationofpoliticsattributabletotheweakness
of non-political actors is representative of Polish decision-making (Ion-
i¸ t˘ a , –), Slovenia displays a stronger civil society – party system
interaction, which contrasts with the ‘associational wasteland’ scenario
supported by authors like Oﬀe and Bönker.
  
 
The o, o and  play crucial roles in  pension reforms. Dur-
ing the second wave of reforms ‘extraordinary politics’ had already given
way to ‘politics as usual’ (cfr. Balcerowicz , –). Müller (, –
)goesv e ryfarinthatsheclaimsthattheo and o displaydiverging
preferences, inordertobeneﬁttheirconstituencies.Theformerfavoursa
parametric reform within the Beveridge-Bismarckian paradigm and the
latter advocates radical reforms for ﬁscal stability. Thus the o and 
usually agree, but again, according to Müller (, –) their very pres-
ence is contingent on structural factors: ﬁscal imbalances of the pension
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system for the o, external indebtedness for the . Their mutual in-
volvement should guarantee privatisation. Orenstein (, )i sm o r e
cautious and only argues that greater exposure to the  translates it-
self into more fundamental pension reforms. All of these conjectures are
either theoretically or empirically (within this comparison) at least par-
tially unfounded.
Although o Miller was staunchly opposed to radical reforms, the
opposite must be said about o Rop in Slovenia. While Miller was
substituted by B ˛ aczkowski, in order to diminish the distance between
veto actors (Orenstein , ), Rop was given, right after the departure
of  from government, an exclusive mandate in order to enact the
needed reforms after years of immobility and stalemate. This same im-
mobility probably dictated his preference for radical reforms. The other
governmental actor, the , may also have an ambiguous stance to-
wardsradicalreforms,sincehefacesvarioustrade-oﬀs.Theimplicitdebt
puts reformsonthe agenda, but mayrender the o ambivalent towards
privatisation. Withhighexplicit debt, the o prefers reforms,which re-
duce future ﬁscal obligations, but the implicit debt conversion may be-
come impossible. Underdeveloped capital markets make reforms which
increase savings very palatable, but they also give rise to concerns about
the funds’ performance (Brooks and James , –;M ü l l e r,
). In Poland o Kołodko was consistently pro reform. In Slovenia
o Gaspari was not. At ﬁrst he was absent, due to the decision-making
procedures in Slovenia (the exclusive delegation of reforms to the rele-
vantMinistry); subsequently hebecamepassive,ashedidnotparticipate
in the drafting of the  and he de facto delegated the responsibility of
transition ﬁnancing to Rop. Gaspari intervened only when the stalemate
between Rop and was harshest, and opposed the second pillar only
after Bole’s publication (Stanovnik , , –). Thus the standard
roles of the o and o, as they are envisaged by Müller, were in Slove-
nia inverted.
Since the  was not operating in a political vacuum it had to use
both direct and indirect interventions to overcome opposition (Oren-
stein , ). In both countries the  was active and it inﬂuenced
the political debate from the beginning. Interestingly, its proposals were
at ﬁrst met with greater reservations in Poland than in Slovenia (Goli-
nowska , ), and both countries homogenised their views on the
funded element with the establishment of a single governmental special
oﬃce (the  in Poland) or working group (for the  in Slovenia).
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H o w e v e r ,t h eo u t c o m e sw e r ed i ﬀerent: ‘Security through Diversity’ was
better designed than the White Paper. Nonetheless, it cannot be ap r i -
ori said that the  had less leverage in Slovenia than in Poland. While
direct assistance was greater in the latter, the  sponsored trips and
conferences, allocated funds and relied on Milan Vodopivec, a former
 oﬃcial, for advising o Rop (Stanovnik , ). The reaction
to Bole’s paper (which claimed that transition costs would be unsus-
tainable) demonstrates the ’s consistent pursuance of a speciﬁc plan
for Slovenia. The Bank’s ‘top brass’ was aghast and ceased sponsoring
the country’s pension reforms from the very moment the paper was
presented, refusing even to publish it (Stanovnik , –; Stanovnik
).
  

Retrenchment policies are essentially unpopular, resulting in a politi-
cal exercise in blame avoidance (Müller , –), since their advo-
cates face a trade-oﬀ between their policy preferences and electoral am-
bitions (Pierson , ). Therefore pension reforms must minimise
anti-reform mobilisation from concentrated interest groups (Orenstein
, ) using obfuscation, division and compensation tactics (Pierson
, ; Brooks and James , –). In order to spread the blame,
as many veto actors as possible have to be included in the reforms’ de-
sign, otherwise their exclusion from an early phase may result in harsher
opposition at a later stage (Orenstein , –). In this respect some
authors (Bonoli , ; Orenstein , –) contend that fewer
veto points are equalled with more radical reforms and retrenchment.
The number of veto points depends on institutional factors, electoral re-
sults and the strength of the pro-welfare coalition (Bonoli , –).
Thus minority governments and grand coalitions will have to accommo-
date moredemands than baremajority governments, and the strength of
trade unions will diminish the executive’s room for manoeuvre. On the
otherhandpowerconcentrationposesaccountabilityproblems:compet-
itive political systems, electoral rules and the political cycle all play a role
(Bonoli , –). In fact Ross (, ) demonstrates that grand
coalitions, where blame is spread among the coalition partners, were in
the s more conducive to retrenchment than less diﬀuse executives.
The task is now to explain why Slovenia did reject radical reforms de-
spite the fact that its institutions and politics constantly produced fewer
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veto points than the Polish counterparts. In addition to institutional fac-
tors, such as a quasi-unicameral parliamentary system in Slovenia and
a semi-presidential bicameral one in Poland, Slovenia had even greater
power concentration, because Rop was given a full mandate for the re-
form of pensions (which is a distinctive feature of Slovenian decision-
making). On the other hand the strength of the pro-welfare coalition
was much underestimated in Slovenia.
The analysis of pro-welfare coalitions shows that pensioners were
considered unanimous voters, while trade unions appeared too frag-
mentedtobethreatening(Böhm;Chło´ n,).Radicalreforms
have therefore an advantage over rationalisation, in that they can be de-
signed to minimise the resistance of pensioners by excluding them from
structuralchanges(Nelson,).InPolandthenewsystemwaspre-
cluded to the population older than  and in both countries pensioner
parties were eﬀectively neutralised.
However, exclusionary compensation is not suﬃcient to win trade
unions over. Rop made a double faux pas in that he excluded the 
from both a stage of reforms (commitment-building) and a deliberative
forum (the working group for the White Paper). In addition, he proba-
bly did not believe the could reverse the large public support built
around the . In any case Poland had an easier task than Slovenia. Pol-
ishunionsareweakanddividedalongideologicallines,whileunionden-
sity and collective agreements’ coverage is in Slovenia the highest among
 countries. In addition  was constantly aﬃliated to the oppo-
sition party  and has considerable institutional power over legisla-
tion on labour relations in the Economic and Social Council of Slove-
nia (Stanovnik , ). Therefore the  could eﬀectively act as a
vetoactor bythreatening thegovernment withsocialconﬂict. ’s un-
compromising oppositionagainstthemandatorysecondpillarcanbeat-
tributed to its conviction that thegovernment pursued a ‘hidden agenda’
(Müller,),whichimplied theslashingofﬁrstpillarbeneﬁts, when
the transition costs would become unsustainable. Rop understood that
further pursuance of partial privatisation would have put his whole po-
litical career at risk and therefore the proposal was quietly withdrawn.
This conﬁrms that concentration of accountability may outweigh con-
centration of power eﬀects.
After presenting the three approaches, it is now clear that the most
important actors in both reforms were the , o, o and the
trade unions. Their systematic comparison shows evidently the veto
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Table : Comparison of Polish and Slovenian actors and policy legacies¹⁰
Poland Slovenia
Policy
legacies
Only beneﬁts were individualised.
Need for further individualisation
and for ﬁscal stability.
Both beneﬁts and contributions were
individualised under socialism. Fiscal
stability was paramount.
World
Bank
Great leverage due to external
indebtedness. Both direct and
indirect intervention.
General political and public
acceptance of the ‘new pension
orthodoxy’. More indirect than direct
intervention.
o Miller – rationaliser. B¸ aczkowski –
appointed to diminish the distance
between veto actors. –
pro-reform, independent.
Rop – consistently pro-reform.
o K o ł o d k oa n dh i ss u c c e s s o r s–
consistently pro-reform.
Gaspari – ﬁrst absent due to the
delegation of responsibility to Rop.
Not participating in or opposing
reforms until Bole’s paper.
Trade
unions
Solidarity and –n u m e r i c a l l y
weak, ideologically divided, little
institutional power. Either pro-
reform or accepted side-payments.
–n u m e r i c a l l ys t r o n g ,
ideologically committed to ,
great institutional power.
Consistently against reforms and did
not accept side-payments.
role played by , as compared to Solidarity or . Additionally
’s role was crucially reinforced by the policy legacies, which pre-
vented Slovenian decision-makers from acting unilaterally.
Conclusions
This paper demonstrates how politics and institutions aﬀected pension
reformsinPolandandSloveniaandclearlypointsoutthatthedivergence
of  welfare states is contingent on a multitude of factors, among
which the trade-oﬀ between power concentration and accountability
concentration is paramount. However it is worth stressing that, after
substantial accommodation of special interest groups’ demands, high
cross-parliamentary consensus was reached on the reform programmes
in both Poland and Slovenia (Böhm ; Orenstein , ). This con-
ﬁrms that while there was overall agreement on the need for retrench-
ment the inclusion of neoliberal prescriptions was animatedly debated.
Therefore the actor-centred institutionalist framework is very suitable
for studying  welfare state retrenchment. Both reforms that have
been analysed display path-dependent elements, while the political ac-
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tors’ leeway is testiﬁed by the fact that both radical and incremental re-
form possibilities have been carefully taken into account. Despite this
indisputable general framework, the rest of Müller’s early theories can-
not be systematically applied to Slovenia. Both the ’s approach and
the ambiguous stance of o Gaspariaretelling of the ‘small ’p r o b l e m
which aﬀects Müller’s research.
On the other hand Orenstein’s skilful adaptation of Tsebelis’ veto ac-
tors methodology is fully applicable to the Polish and Slovenian cases.
Nonetheless its limitations are straightforward. The dependent variable
inTsebelis’workisthecapacity for policychange(inthis studytheadop-
tionofamandatoryfully-fundedsecondpillar).Duetothedichotomous
nature of this variable, its use is somehow restricted to the comparisons
of cases when the executive struggles for the adoption or rejection of a
speciﬁc policy. In this respect the approach does not explain much of
the complex exchange and interaction between the involved actors, such
as the government and the social partners, which characterised all 
welfare state reforms. In order to ﬁll in these lacunae, a whole new the-
ory should be developed. A good basis to start from could be the recent
research on the reform of Bismarckian pension systems carried out by
Natali and Rhodes (). Poland and Slovenia show enough similarities
in order not to exclude its applicability. However, even the most sophis-
ticated approaches developed for Western Europe have to be adjusted in
order to account for the patronage, which has been exerted by interna-
tional organisations on politics.
Notes
. Pension reforms in the Czech Republic and Hungary conﬁrm the lack
of convergence.The former retained its  scheme, the latter intro-
duced a fairly large privately managed fully funded second pillar.
.P i e r s o n( , –) mentions three types of retrenchment. Pri-
vatisation falls under recommodiﬁcation, rationalisation under re-
calibration and other cutbacks under cost containment. He associates
eachtypeofretrenchmentwithoneofEsping-Andresen’sthreeworlds
of welfare capitalism (liberal, corporatist-conservative and social-
democratic). In contrast, Natali and Rhodes (, –)c o n t e n dt h a t
a mix of the three is used in any reform of Bismarckian welfare states.
. The trilateral comparison featured in Orenstein () cannot count
on such striking similarities.
.T h e  terminology will be used throughout the paper.
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.S e eT a b l e. Poland and Slovenia display greater implicit debts than
most  countries, excepted Italy.
. Weir and Skocpol’s approach diﬀers from the previous ones in that it
stresses the two dimensions generating the state’s autonomy and in-
ﬂuence: a) the autonomy of its bureaucrats; b) its organisational con-
ﬁguration, which inﬂuences all other societal aspects – the interaction
of political actors, the demandsof interest groups and the inclusion of
intellectual innovations in national policies.
.S e e T a b l e .
. The second pillar was gradually phas e d - i nf o ri m p l i c i td e b ta n dt a c t i -
calsequencingconcerns.Thepopulationoverwasexcludedtoavoid
pensioners’ opposition (Müller , ).
.O r e n s t e i n( , ) rightly predicted that a right government sup-
porting neoliberal arrangements would meet with greater resistance
by ‘old’ trade unions. Nevertheless this idealistic role should not be
overemphasized. Natali and Rhodes (, , –)c o n t e n dt h a tr e -
trenchment politics are not only about blame avoidance, but also in-
volve credit claiming. Political parties and trade unions alike act as
vote-, oﬃce- and policy-seekers. In fact even in Slovenia the  ap-
proved some reforms, which were detrimental to the outsiders.
. For details refer to Guardiancich .
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